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Abstract—We present an approach for dynamically recon-
figuring the role-based access control (RBAC) of information
systems running business processes, to protect them against
insider threats. The new approach uses business process execution
traces and stochastic model checking to establish confidence
intervals for key measurable attributes of user behaviour, and
thus to identify and adaptively demote users who misuse their
access permissions maliciously or accidentally. We implemented
and evaluated the approach and its policy specification formalism
for a real IT support business process, showing their ability to
express and apply a broad range of self-adaptive RBAC policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security incidents caused by insider threats may result in se-
vere financial and reputational loss [1][2]. Insider threats arise
when trusted users of an information system can exploit their
access permissions to compromise the confidentiality, integrity
or availability of an organisation’s information assets [3],
[4]. These trusted users include employees, contractors and
business partners who can cause harm intentionally (e.g.
for personal gain or revenge) or through error (e.g. due to
negligence or insufficient training) [5].
To mitigate these threats, information systems employ con-
trol mechanisms that restrict the access to their assets. More
often than not, these mechanisms implement the role-based
access control (RBAC) [6] model, where the permissions
to execute operations on information assets are associated
with roles, and the users are only assigned the role(s) they
need to perform their jobs. As such, RBAC restricts user
access and helps detect access violation attempts. However,
it cannot detect users who maliciously or accidentally abuse
their legitimate access permissions. Furthermore, it is unable
to mitigate such abuse [7], even when a separate insider attack
detection mechanism [8] is available. For example, in the
context of a ticket support system, a support attendant with
an elevated number of tickets opened on behalf of clients that
are abandoned can be considered an anomaly not detectable
by RBAC.
Our work addresses this limitation of traditional RBAC in
the context of business processes. To this end, we exploit
activity logs already available for many important businesses
processes, which also enable the monitoring of the activities
undertaken by individual users of these processes. Using this
information, dynamic access control mechanisms can be em-
ployed to respond to abnormal user behaviour through actions
decided based on risk analysis and pre-defined adaptation
policies. Such actions may include changes to authorisation
policies, modifications of user assignment to roles and of role
permissions, user training, and changes to the business process.
In this paper, we introduce a self-adaptive RBAC (saRBAC)
approach that enacts these general principles by dynamically
reconfiguring user assignments to roles in order to mitigate
insider threats. As an example, users with abnormal behaviour
may be removed from a role or may be demoted to roles with
restricted permissions. Our saRBAC approach is underpinned
by the analysis of stochastic models that enable the comparison
of individual user behaviour to the average behaviour of the
other users in the same role. Given a business process and
traces of its execution obtained through monitoring, saRBAC
(a) builds a parametric Markov model of the process, and
(b) uses FACT [9], [10], a probabilistic model checker, to
establish confidence intervals for model properties associated
with key aspects of user behaviour. For each user and analysed
property, two confidence intervals are computed corresponding
to the property value for the user, and for all the other users
taken together, respectively. If the two confidence intervals
do not overlap, then saRBAC concludes that the examined
user behaves (statistically) differently from the other users.
The analysed properties, the definition of what constitutes
abnormal behaviour, and the actions required when such
behaviour is detected are formally specified in saRBAC adap-
tation policies.
We evaluated saRBAC within the information system run-
ning the IT support business process at the Federal Institute of
Education, Science, and Technology of Rio Grande do Norte
(IFRN), Brazil, an organisation with over 44,000 users. We de-
vised the saRBAC adaptation policies together with the IFRN
management team. Because of the business-critical nature of
the system, we ran saRBAC as an advisory system suggesting
access control modifications that IT managers could verify
instead of implementing them directly. However, the code for
a fully automated operation is in place, and given the positive
evaluation results (described later in the paper) we expect it
to be activated within the near future.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
presents background information on stochastic modelling and
probabilistic model checking with confidence intervals. Sec-
tion III introduces the real case study used to illustrate and
evaluate our approach. Section IV describes the saRBAC
approach and its adaptation policies. The saRBAC implemen-
tation we used for the IFRN system and the evaluation results
are presented in Sections V and VI, respectively. Finally,
Section VII compares our approach with related research, and
Section VIII concludes the paper with a brief summary.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs) DTMCs provide
a formal modelling framework for state transition systems in
which the selection of successor states is controlled through
probabilistic choice [11]. A Markov chain is memoryless, in
that the next state only relies on the current state and not the
path that led to the current state.
Definition 1. A (labeled) DTMC over an atomic proposition
set AP is a tuple
M = (S, s0,P , L) (1)
where S is a finite set of states; s0 ∈ S is the initial state;
P : S × S → [0, 1] is the transition probability function such
that for each state s the probability of moving to state s′ in
a single transition is P (s, s′) and
∑
s′∈S P (s, s
′) = 1; and
L : S → 2AP is a labelling function that maps each state to
the set of atomic propositions that hold in that state.
A path pi overM is a possibly infinite sequence of states from
S such that for any adjacent states s and s′ in pi, P(s, s′) > 0.
The m-th state on a path pi, m ≥ 1, is denoted pi(m). Finally,
for any state s ∈ S, PathsM(s) represents the set of all
infinite paths over M that start with state s.
In using DTMCs to model real-world systems, it is often
the case that the DTMC states and transitions can be derived
(sometimes automatically) from existing system artefacts such
as activity diagrams, architectural models or, in the case of
software, from the actual code. In contrast, the probabilities
associated with the state transitions are more difficult to
determine, requiring the use of parametric DTMCs.
Definition 2. A parametric DTMC is a discrete-time Markov
chain (1) in which some or all the transition probabilities P
are unknown.
Cost/reward structures are used to extend the range of
properties that can be verified using DTMCs. These structures
associate nonnegative values with the states and/or transitions
of a (parametric) DTMC. Depending on the verified property,
these values are interpreted as costs (e.g. resource use or price)
or rewards (e.g. throughput or profit).
Definition 3. A cost/reward structure over a Markov chain
M = (S, s0,P, L) is a pair of functions (ρ, ι) such that:
• ρ : S → R≥0 is the state reward function (a vector);
• ι :S×S→R≥0 is the transition reward function (a matrix).
Probabilistic computation tree logic (PCTL) PCTL [12]
provides a formal language for the specification of verifiable
properties of DTMCs.
Definition 4. Let AP be a set of atomic propositions and
a ∈ AP , p ∈ [0, 1], k ∈ N, r ∈ R and ./ ∈ {≥, >,<,≤}.
Then a state formula Φ and a path formula Ψ in probabilistic
computation tree logic (PCTL) are defined by the grammar:
Φ ::= true | a | Φ ∧ Φ | ¬Φ | P./p[Ψ] (2)
Ψ ::= XΦ | ΦUΦ | ΦU≤kΦ (3)
and a cost/reward state formula is defined by the grammar:
Φ ::= R./r[I=k] | R./r[C≤k] | R./r[FΦ] | R./r[S]. (4)
The semantics of PCTL is defined with a satisfaction
relation |= over the states S and the paths PathsM(s), s ∈ S,
of a DTMC (1). Thus, s |= Φ means “Φ is satisfied in state s”.
For any state s ∈ S, we have: s |= true; s |= a iff a ∈ L(s);
s |= ¬Φ iff ¬(s |= Φ); and s |= Φ1 ∧ Φ2 iff s |= Φ1 and
s |= Φ2. A state formula P./p[Ψ] is satisfied in a state s if the
probability of the future evolution of the system satisfying Ψ
satisfies ./ p, where:
• the “next” formula XΦ is satisfied by a path pi iff Φ is
satisfied in the next state of pi (i.e., in state pi(2));
• the time bounded “until” formula Φ1U≤kΦ2 is satisfied
by a path pi iff Φ1 is satisfied in each of the first x states
of pi for some x < k, and Φ2 is satisfied in the (x+1)-th
state of pi;
• the unbounded “until” formula Φ1UΦ2 is satisfied by a
path pi iff Φ1 is true in each of the first x> 0 states of
pi, and Φ2 is true in the (x+1)-th state of pi.
The notation F≤kΦ ≡ trueU≤kΦ and FΦ ≡ trueUΦ is
used when the first part of a bounded until and until formula,
respectively, is true .
In addition, given a cost/reward structure in the form from
Definition 3, PCTL was extended with reward constraints
that support the specification of both expected and cumulative
rewards [13]. Thus, the cost/reward operator R can be used
to analyse the expected cost at timestep k (R./r[I=k]), the
expected cumulative cost up to time step k (R./r[C≤k]), the
expected cumulative cost to reach a future state that satisfies a
property Φ (R./r[FΦ]), and the expected steady-state reward
in the long run (R./r[S]).
Probabilistic model checking with confidence intervals
Probabilistic model checkers (e.g. PRISM [14] and MRMC
[15]) use symbolic model checking algorithms to establish if
a PCTL formula P./p[Ψ] is satisfied by calculating the actual
probability that Ψ is satisfied, and comparing it with the bound
p. Therefore, calculating the actual probability does not add
any complexity, and the extended PCTL syntax P=?[Ψ] can
be used (for the outermost P operator of a PCTL formula)
to obtain this probability. This also applies to cost/reward
PCTL formulae, for which R=?[I=k], R=?[C≤k], R=?[FΦ],
and R=?[S] are used similarly.
While “standard” probabilistic model checking has been
used to develop self-adaptive systems before (e.g. [16], [17],
[18], [19]), in this paper we use the recently introduced
probabilistic model checker FACT [9], [10], which computes
confidence intervals for the extended-syntax properties P=?[Ψ]
and R=?[. . .] of parametric DTMCs for which observations
of the state transitions associated with unknown probabilities
are available. Notice that this is completely different from the
established practice of assuming that the transition probabili-
ties have fixed known values and using discrete-event simula-
tion (sometimes called “statistical model checking”) to com-
pute confidence intervals for the properties of non-parametric
DTMCs. This functionally is provided by many model check-
ers, including PRISM. In contrast, FACT takes into account
the fact that transition probabilities are unknown multinomial-
distributed random variables, uses precise parametric model
checking to obtain a closed-form expression of the analysed
property, and exploits actual observations of the transitions to
calculate a confidence interval for this expression. As such,
FACT is particularly suited for our approach, where business
processes logs containing such observations are available but
the probabilities with which different activities are executed
are typically unknown.
III. CASE STUDY
We will illustrate and evaluate our approach using a business
process implemented by the SUAP1 information system of the
Federal Institute of Education, Science, and Technology of
Rio Grande do Norte (IFRN), Brazil. SUAP is used for most
of IFRN’s administrative processes, is actively developed and
maintained by the IT Management Directorate of IFRN, and
has been adopted by 25 federal institutes all over Brazil. The
IFRN SUAP users comprise 12,500 academic, administrative,
technical staff and contractors, and 32,000 students, located at
the 26 IFRN campuses in the state of Rio Grande do Norte.
The SUAP business process we use in our work is the
Ticket Support process from Figure 1, which allows IFRN
users to request IT support services (e.g. access and password
changes) and to report IT-related problems. SUAP’s business
processes are security sensitive, and the RBAC access control
model is used to enforce security policies. In this context, the
Ticket Support process involves three roles: Client, Support
and Administrator. A Client is any user who needs some IT
service done and can raise issues by opening tickets. A Support
user is an employee responsible for dealing with tickets, e.g.
an IT technician or analyst. The system also includes the
Administrator role, which comprises users responsible for
supervising the work carried out by Support users.
As shown in Figure 1 the Ticket Support process starts with
the opening of a ticket, either by a client (Open ticket) or by a
support attendant on behalf of a client (Open ticket of behalf ),
e.g., the client might go to the IT department in person to raise
an issue. An open ticket can be cancelled by the client (Cancel
ticket by user), e.g., if the ticket was opened by mistake, or can
be allocated to a support attendant. Ticket allocation can be
done by an administrator (Allocate to support), or by support
attendants themselves (Allocate to self ).
Once allocated, a support attendant will work on the ticket
(Check ticket)—solving the issue (Solve ticket), reallocating
1Sistema Unificado de Administrao Pu´blica – Unified System for Public
Administration
the ticket to a different support attendant (Reallocate ticket),
cancelling the ticket (Cancel ticket by support), or suspending
the ticket and asking the client to provide more information
about the issue (Suspend ticket). Suspended tickets are sent
back to clients, who can either reply to the support attendant
(Add more information), or cancel the ticket (Cancel ticket by
user). If the client does not reply within a specific time, the
ticket is considered abandoned and is cancelled by the support
attendant (Cancel abandoned ticket).
A solved ticket is sent back to its client, who can confirm the
resolution of the issue by closing it (Close ticket), or reopen the
ticket (Reopen ticket) indicating that the issue is not resolved.
A solved ticket not handled by the client within a certain time
frame is closed by an administrator (Close expired ticket).
We used SUAP’s extensive logging capabilities to obtain
detailed execution traces of the Ticket Support process for
the three-month period between May–July 2016, and we
interviewed the IFRN management team to determine the
organisation’s insider-threat concerns for the process. As such,
we learnt about concerns based both on past cases of internal
abuse and on yet unconfirmed incident scenarios identified
by their security risk management procedures. Using these
concerns, we defined a set of adaptation policies that capture
abnormal behaviours of Ticket Support users, and preferred
ways of dealing with them. Table I shows a representative
subset of these policies, expressed informally in terms of con-
fidence intervals for measurable attributes of user behaviour.
The appropriate confidence levels for these policies were
initially unknown, so they were obtained through experimental
calibration such as to minimise the number of false positives
and false negative over a subset of users whose behaviour was
carefully examined by IT managers. Our saRBAC approach
formalises these adaptation policies and implements them as
described in the next section.
IV. THE SARBAC APPROACH
A. Business process description
Our approach is applicable to a business process imple-
mented by an RBAC-based information system whose users
are organised into n>0 roles. We assume that the sets of users
associated with the n roles are Role1, Role2, . . . , Rolen (so
the set of all users is Users =
⋃n
i=1 Rolei), that the business
process carries out activities from an activity set A, and that
a UML activity diagram of the process is available. Also, we
use Ai ⊆ A to denote the set of activities that can be executed
by Rolei, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Accordingly, the set of activities
that a generic user u ∈ Users has permissions to execute
is perm(u) = {a ∈ A | ∃1 ≤ i ≤ n • u ∈ Rolei ∧ a ∈ Ai}.
To augment the business process with self-adaptive RBAC
capabilities, we require that monitoring is used to record traces
of all process executions, and assume that traces have the form
〈a1, u1, a2, u2, . . . , am, um〉, (5)
where a1, a2, . . . , am ∈ A is the ordered list of activities
performed by an execution of the business process, and
u1, u2, . . . , um ∈ Users are the users that carried out each
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Fig. 1. Ticket Support business process (UML activity diagram produced during IFRN’s development of the SUAP information system)
TABLE I
ADAPTATION POLICIES FOR THE TICKET SUPPORT PROCESS
ID Description
P1 A client whose expected number of reopens per ticket (at
confidence level α = 0.95) is larger than that of the other
clients should be not be allowed to open new tickets.
P2 A support attendant whose expected number of suspensions
per ticket (α = 0.95) exceeds that of the other attendants
should be closely monitored and should need approval for
suspending tickets. Additionally, the clients that have been
served by this attendant should be considered; if their ex-
pected number of suspensions per ticket for tickets handled
by other attendants (α=0.99) is lower than that of the other
clients, then the investigated attendant should be suspended.
P3 A support attendant whose probability of cancelling ticket
that have not been suspended (α = 0.95) exceeds that of
the other support team members should need approval for
cancelling tickets.
P4 A support attendant whose expected number of tickets
opened on behalf of clients are abandoned (α=0.95) exceeds
that of the other support team members should no longer be
allowed to open tickets on behalf of clients.
P5 A support attendant whose expected number of reallocations,
suspensions, cancellations or reopens per ticket (α = 0.80)
exceeds that of the other support attendants should be placed
under observation. Additionally, if this discrepancy is also
confirmed with a higher confidence level of α = 0.95, the
support attendant should need approval for his or her actions.
P6 A client whose expected number of suspensions, reopens,
abandonments or cancellations by support per ticket (α =
0.90) exceeds that of the other clients should be placed
under observation. Additionally, the support attendants that
have dealt with by this client should be considered; if their
expected number of suspensions, reopens, abandonments or
cancellations by support per ticket (α= 0.90) is lower than
that of the other support attendants, then the investigated
client should not be allowed to open new tickets.
of these activities, respectively. We use T to denote the set
of all recorded business process traces, and traces(u) ⊆ T to
represent the set of all traces comprising at least one activity
performed by user u ∈ Users:
traces(u)={〈a1, u1, . . . , am, um〉∈T | ∃1≤ i ≤ m • ui=u}.
Finally, the set of traces for a user subset U ⊆ Users is given
by traces(U) =
⋃
u∈U traces(u).
Example 1. The Ticket Support process from Section III
uses n = 3 roles, i.e. Role1 = Client , Role2 = Support
and Role3 = Admin . The activity sets for these roles are
A1={Open, Reopen, AddInformation, Close, CancelByUser},
A2 = {OpenOnBehalf, AllocateToSelf, Check, Reallocate,
Solve, Suspend, CancelBySupport, CancelAbandoned}, A3=
{AllocateToSupport, CloseExpired}, and the entire activity
set is A = A1∪A2∪A3. A possible Ticket Support execution
trace involving users u1 ∈ Client and u2 ∈ Support is
〈Open, u1,AllocateToSelf, u2,Check, u2,Solve, u2,Close, u1〉.
B. Parametric DTMC of a business process
For a business process with the above characteristics, we
devise a parametric DTMC model (1) from its UML activity
diagram as follows. First, we build the finite state set S
comprising a state for each activity node from the diagram,
and an initial state s0 and a final state sF for the initial and
final nodes of the activity diagram, respectively; let node(s)
denote the activity diagram node associated with state s ∈ S.
We then assemble the transition probability matrix P :
• We set P (s, s′) = 1.0 for every pair of states s, s′ ∈ S for
which the node reached immediately after node(s) (i.e.
without going through intermediate nodes associated with
states from S) is always node(s′), and for s = s′ = sF.
• We associate an unknown transition probability P (s, s′)
with each pair of states s, s′ for which node(s′) can be
reached from node(s) going only through decision nodes
in the activity diagram.
• We set P (s, s′)=0 for every other pair of states s, s′∈S.
Next, we define a labelling function L that labels each state
s ∈ S with an atomic proposition that suggestively reflects the
state of the system after the execution of the activity associated
with node(s). For instance, we used the label Allocated for the
DTMC state associated with the activity AllocateToSupport of
our Ticket Support process. Finally, we augment the resulting
DTMC with cost/reward structures modelling the measurable
attributes of user behaviour from a set of adaptation policies
similar to those from Table I.
Example 2. Applying the DTMC derivation method described
s0
0|0|0|0
s1
0|0|0|0
s2
0|0|0|0
s3
0|0|0|0
s4
0|0|0|0
s14
0|0|0|0
s5
0|0|0|0
s10
0|0|0|0
s9
1|1|0|1
s6
0|0|0|2
s7
0|0|0|0
s8
1|0|1|1
s11
0|0|0|0
sF
0|0|0|0
s12
0|0|0|0
s13
3|0|0|1
s15
2|0|0|0
{Reallocated} {Reopened} {Cancelled}
{Closed}{Allocated}
{Allocated}
{Cancelled}
{Opened}
{Opened on behalf}
{Allocated}
{Cancelled,
{Suspended}
{Checking}
{Solved}
{Closed}
Abandoned}
{End}
Fig. 2. Parametric DTMC model of the Ticket System. The transition
probabilities are not shown because they are user-dependent and unknown
(for states with multiple outgoing transitions) or 1.0 (for states with a single
outgoing transition).
above to the Ticket Support activity diagram from Figure 1
yields the DTMC shown in Figure 2. The 17 states of this
DTMC correspond to the 15 activities of the business process
plus the initial and final states of the activity diagram, and
the labelling captures the state of a ticket during the execution
of the process. The number combinations r1|r2|r3|r4 annotat-
ing the DTMC states define four cost/reward structures (cf.
Definition 1) used to formalise the policies from Table I: an
“expensive” client structure (r1, cf. policy P6 from Table I),
a “suspended” structure (r2, cf. policy P2), a “reopened”
structure (r3, cf. policy P1), and a “lazy” support staff structure
(r4, cf. policy P5). For example, state s6 (which corresponds
to a ticket being reallocated by a member of the support team)
is annotated with r1|r2|r3|r4 = 0|0|0|2, indicating that ticket
reallocation is not characteristic of an expensive client (r1=0),
is not a reopen or suspension (r2 = r3 = 0), but is a strong
characteristic of “lazy” support staff (r4=2).
C. Self-adaptive RBAC policies
Given a business process, its parametric DTMC M =
(S, S0,P ,AP , L) constructed as described in Section IV-B,
and its set of execution traces T , the self-adaptation policies
supported by our approach are sequences of rules
policy = 〈rule1, rule2, . . . , ruleN 〉, (6)
where each rule rulei, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is a tuple
rulei = (filter i,Φi, ./i, αi, post i). (7)
The elements of the above rule are as follows:
1) filter i is a first-order logic expression that specifies
constraints for 2n user sets Rtesti,1 , R
ref
i,1 ⊆ Role1,
Rtesti,2 , R
ref
i,2 ⊆ Role2, . . . , Rtesti,n , Rrefi,n ⊆ Rolen. For
example, the filter
Rtesti,1 ={u} ∧ Rrefi,1 =Role1 \Rtesti,1
holds for all pairs of user sets (Rtesti,1 , R
ref
i,1) for which
Rtesti,1 consists of a single user u ∈ Role1 and Rrefi,1
comprises all the users from Role1 except user u.
2) φi is a PCTL formula over the atomic propositions AP .
3) ./i∈ {<,≤,≥, >} is a relational operator;
Algorithm 1 Application of saRBAC rule and policy
1: function APPLYRULE(M, policy , i, Λ)
2: for all Rtesti,1 , Rrefi,1⊆Role1, Rtesti,2 , Rrefi,2⊆Rolen, . . . ,
Rtesti,n , R
ref
i,n⊆Rolen such that filter i holds do
3: T testi ←
⋂
1≤j≤n,Rtesti,j 6=∅ traces(R
test
i,j )
4: T refi ←
⋂
1≤j≤n,Rrefi,j 6=∅ traces(R
ref
i,j )
5: [atesti , b
test
i ]← CONFINTERVAL(M, T testi , Φi, αi)
6: [arefi , b
ref
i ]← CONFINTERVAL(M, T refi , Φi, αi)
7: if [atesti , btesti ] ./i [arefi , brefi ] then
8: RECONFIGURERBAC(post i)
9: if i < N then
10: Λ← Λ_〈Rtesti,1 , Rtesti,2 , . . . , Rtesti,n 〉
11: APPLYRULE(M, policy , i+1, Λ)
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: end function
16:
17: function APPLYPOLICY(M, policy)
18: APPLYRULE(M, policy , 1, 〈〉)
19: end function
4) αi ∈ (0, 1) is a confidence level.
5) The postcondition post i is a first-order logic expression
which specifies constraints that must hold if rulei is ap-
plied as explained below. For example, the postcondition
∀u ∈ Rtesti,1 •perm ′(u) = perm(u)\{Open} holds if the
users in Rtesti,1 are no longer able to execute the operation
Open after the application of rulei.
The application of rule (7) involves the execution of func-
tion APPLYRULE from Algorithm 1. This function takes as
parameters the DTMC model M of the business process, a
policy (6), the index i of the rule to apply, and the sequence
Λ = 〈Rtest1,1 , Rtest1,2 , . . . , Rtest1,n , . . . , Rtesti−1,1, Rtesti−1,2, . . . , Rtesti−1,n〉
of “test” user sets from the applications of the previous i− 1
rules of policy . The function executes the for loop in lines
2–14 over all distinct combinations of user sets Rtesti,1 , R
ref
i,1 ,
Rtesti,2 , R
ref
i,2 , . . . , R
test
i,n , R
ref
i,n that satisfy filter i. For each such
combination, subsets of test traces T testi and reference traces
T refi are first built in lines 3 and 4. These subsets contain
the traces of all business process executions that comprise
at least one activity carried out by a user from each of
the non-empty user sets Rtesti,1 , R
test
i,2 , . . . , R
test
i,n and R
ref
i,1 ,
Rrefi,2 , . . . , R
ref
i,n, respectively. Next, the parametric DTMC M
and the observations from the trace subsets T testi and T
ref
i
are used to establish test and reference confidence intervals
[atesti , b
test
i ] and [a
ref
i , b
ref
i ] for the property Φi, with confidence
level αi (lines 5 and 6). Finally, if the rule precondition
[atesti , b
test
i ] ./i [a
ref
i , b
ref
i ]
2 (line 7) then (i) the RBAC system
is dynamically reconfigured (as described in the next section)
so that post i holds (line 8); and (ii) if rulei is not the last rule
from policy (6) (i.e. if i <N ), rulei+1 is also applied (lines
2We extend the relational operators to work with intervals in the natural
way, e.g. [x1, y1] < [x2, y2] iff y1 < x2.
TABLE II
FORMALISED SELF-ADAPTATION POLICIES FOR THE TICKET SUPPORT BUSINESS PROCESS
ID i filter i Φi ./i αi post i
P1 1 Rtest1,1 ={u} ∧Rtest1,2 =Support ∧ Rreopened=? [F End] > .95 perm ′(u) = perm(u) \ {Open}
Rref1,1=Client\{u} ∧Rref1,2=Support
P2 1 Rtest1,1 =Client ∧Rtest1,2 ={u} ∧ Rsuspended=? [F End] > .95 perm ′(u)=(perm(u)\{Suspend}) ∪
Rref1,1=Client ∧Rref1,2=Support\{u} {SuspendWithApproval}
2 Rtest2,1 ={v∈Client | traces(v)∩traces(Rtest1,2 ) 6=∅} Rsuspended=? [F End] < .99 u ∈ Rtest1,2 → perm ′(u)=∅
∧ Rtest2,2 =Support\Rtest1,2 ∧
Rref2,1=Client\Rtest2,1 ∧Rref2,2=Rtest2,2
P3 1 Rtest1,1 =Client ∧Rtest1,2 ={u} ∧ P=?[¬Suspended U > .95 perm ′(u)=(perm(u)\{Cancel}) ∪
Rref1,1=Client ∧Rref1,2=Support\{u} Cancelled] {CancelWithApproval}
P4 1 Rtest1,1 =Client ∧Rtest1,2 ={u} ∧ P=?[¬Opened U > .95 perm ′(u)=perm(u) \ {OpenOnBehalf}
Rref1,1=Client ∧Rref1,2=Support\{u} Abandoned]
P5 1 Rtest1,1 =Client ∧Rtest1,2 ={u} ∧ Rlazy=? [F End] > .80 perm ′(u)=(perm(u) \ {Check,
Rref1,1=Client ∧Rref1,2=Support\{u} Solve,Suspend}) ∪ {MonitoredCheck,
MonitoredSolve,MonitoredSuspend}
2 Rtest2,1 =Client ∧Rtest2,2 =Rtest1,2 ∧ Rlazy=? [F End] > .95 perm ′(u)=(perm(u) \ {Check,
Rref2,1=Client ∧Rref2,2=Rref1,2 Solve,Suspend}) ∪ {CheckWithApproval,
SolveWithApproval, SuspendWithApproval}
P6 1 Rtest1,1 ={u} ∧Rtest1,2 =Support ∧ Rexpensive=? [F End] > .90 perm ′(u) = (perm(u) \ {Open,
Rref1,1=Client\{u} ∧Rref1,2=Support Reopen,AddInformation})∪{MonitoredOpen,
MonitoredReopen,MonitoredAddInformation}
2 Rtest2,1 = Client\Rtest1,1 ∧Rtest2,2 = {v ∈ Support | Rexpensive=? [F End] < .90 u ∈ Rtest1,1 → perm ′(u)=perm(u) \ {Open}
traces(v) ∩ traces(Rtest1,1 ) 6= ∅} ∧
Rref2,1=R
test
2,1 ∧Rref2,2=Support\Rtest2,2
9–12), which involves extending the sequence Λ of “test” user
sets in line 10. Thus, the semantics of policy (6) is given by
∀Rtest1,1 , Rref1,1⊆Role1; . . . ;Rtest1,n , Rref1,n⊆Rolen •(
filter1(R
test
1,1 , R
ref
1,1, . . . , R
test
1,n, R
ref
1,n)∧
[atest1 , b
test
1 ]./1[a
ref
1 , b
ref
1 ]
)→ (post1(RBAC′) ∧ . . .)) ,
where [atest1 , b
test
1 ], [a
ref
1 , b
ref
1 ] are computed as shown in lines 5
and 6 of Algorithm 1, RBAC′ is the state of the RBAC system
after the reconfiguration from line 8, and the ellipses stand for
the descriptions of rules 2, 3, . . . , N of the policy.
The intuition behind this application of rulei is that Rtesti,1 ,
Rtesti,2 , . . . , R
test
i,n include users whose behaviour with respect to
the property encoded by φi is being examined by comparison
to the value of the same property for the “reference” users
from Rrefi,1 , R
ref
i,2 , . . . , R
ref
i,n. The values of Φi for the test
and reference users cannot be calculated precisely, so the
observations associated with the available traces are used to
obtain two confidence intervals for φi. If these confidence
intervals do not overlap, and are in the relationship indicated
by ./i, then the behaviour of the examined users is suspicious
and the RBAC system is dynamically adapted to satisfy post i.
The N > 1 rules of a policy (6) are applied in order, with
rulei+1, 1 ≤ i<N , applied if and only if the application of
rulei resulted in RBAC changes, so a policy (6) is applied by
invoking the application of its first rule, as shown by function
APPLYPOLICY from Algorithm 1. The rationale is to further
examine the behaviour of suspicious users, e.g. by establishing
additional properties for these users or by calculating higher
confidence intervals for the same property, with further actions
taken to restrict their access permissions if necessary.
Example 3. Table II shows how the informal policies from
Table I can be formalised. For example, policy P1 con-
tains a single rule whose test and reference traces are con-
strained by filter1 to the traces of an individual client user
(Rtest1,1 = {u}) and the traces of the remaining client users
(Rref1,1 = Client \{u}), respectively. The policy PCTL formula
Φ1 =Rreopened=? [F End] indicates that confidence intervals for
the expected number of Reopen operations performed on a
(generic) ticket should be calculated, with confidence level
α1=0.95. Finally, ./i=> requires that RBAC adaptations are
made if the 0.95-confidence interval for the test traces (i.e. for
an individual client) is larger than 0.95-confidence interval for
the reference traces (i.e. for the remaining clients); and the
postcondition perm ′(u)=perm(u)\{Open} requires that the
offending client must lose the permission to perform Open
activities after these RBAC adaptations.
D. RBAC adaptations
We selected the RBAC adaptation actions used to achieve
the postconditions from saRBAC policies based on the
functions defined by the RBAC specification [6]:
• creation and maintenance of elements and relations (e.g.,
add/delete of user/role, the assign/deassign of users and
roles, and grant/revoke of permissions to roles);
• supporting user activities that are dynamic, i.e. that are
performed as part of user sessions (e.g., create/delete
session, add/drop active role, and check access); and
• reviewing the results of the previous actions, i.e., functions
for making queries on the basic sets and relations (e.g.,
AssignedRoles, RolePermissions, SessionRoles, UserPer-
missions, UserOperationsOnObject).
Fig. 3. saRBAC architecture (existing components are shaded)
Using these functions, saRBAC postconditions are achieved
by Removing (i.e., disabling) elements from sets, and Adding
(assigning) or Removing (revoking/deassigning) relations be-
tween users, roles, and permissions. Note that saRBAC dis-
ables instead of deleting RBAC elements as part of its adap-
tation actions, facilitating the reactivation of these elements
by a system administrator upon reviewing the reasons for
the adaptation. To deal with cases where a permission or
permission set should be removed from a user, saRBAC
employs restricted versions of the role without that particular
permission (set). In our implementation, these restricted roles
are identified by pre-analysing the adaptation policies, and are
added to the system before the policies are actually set up.
Example 4. Consider again the adaptation policies from our
Ticket System case study. The postcondition from the first
(and only) rule of policy P1 requires the removal of the Open
permission from offending client users. As such, our saRBAC
approach creates a new role Role4 = ClientOpenRestricted
during its pre-analysis stage. This new role is then used
whenever policy P1 is applied to an offending user u ∈ Client
at runtime, by removing user u from the Client role and
adding him or her to the ClientOpenRestricted role.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented a prototype for saRBAC in Python follow-
ing a service-oriented architecture (Figure 3). This allowed the
deployment of saRBAC components across several processing
nodes, and thus the parallel analysis of multiple users. The
prototype was integrated into the SUAP system as an advisory
tool for IFRN management.
The Manager component is responsible for coordinating the
analysis process according to Algorithm 1. This component
interfaces with the system under analysis, represented by the
SUAP component. The Manager is able to obtain logging
information from SUAP containing the execution traces of its
business processes, and information about its RBAC access
control policy. Besides the information retrieved from SUAP,
the Manager receives as input the parametric Markov model
and policies definition. In its current implementation, the
Manager component also receives as input the set of users
to be analysed as part of the received policy definition.
Based on the log records obtained from SUAP the Manager
builds the set of traces T for the business process being
analysed. The Log Analyser component receives filter def-
initions as input, which ones are applied to the traces T .
Filter definitions have been implemented using the keyword
argument mechanism of the Python programming language.
This component then produces the subsets of test traces T testi
and reference traces T refi . The Model Updater component
analyses these traces in order to instantiate the parametric
Markov model from Figure 2 to reflect the behaviour of
observed users.
Finally, we use the FACT model checker [10] to compute
confidence intervals for the property being evaluated. FACT
uses the parametric probabilistic model checking functionality
of PRISM to obtain a closed-form expression for the property,
and the algorithms introduced in [9] to obtain the required
confidence intervals based on the process traces. The Manager
then follows the policy being evaluated, comparing the con-
fidence intervals computed by FACT and yielding an RBAC
adaptation recommendation if needed. When a policy contains
more than one rule, the Manager processes one rule at a time.
The Database component stores the data produced during the
analysis process.
VI. EVALUATION
To evaluate saRBAC, we conducted a series of experiments
using our prototype implementation with real data from SUAP.
The experiments aimed to show the feasibility of saRBAC to
the IFRN IT management directorate. This section summarises
the main results obtained in these experiments, divided into
three parts. We begin by describing the experiments conducted
to calibrate the confidence levels used for each policy (Section
VI-A), followed by results about the use of the approach after
calibration (Section VI-B). Finally, we present experiments
that assess the performance of saRBAC (Section VI-C).
A. Preliminary Experiments and Confidence Level Calibration
For each policy, it is necessary to calibrate the confidence
level used to identify deviations in user behaviour whilst min-
imising the number of false positives. Automatic calibration
of confidence levels remains a topic for further work and
therefore a manual calibration was carried out as follows.
Data collected for 63 users of the system was considered
over a time window of 30 days and, for users with the Client
role, three different subsets were considered. Initially, we
selected users that are already known by the IT team, either in
a positive or negative way. These are referred in the rest of the
section as the subset of “famous” users. A second subset was
defined as the most active users in which we selected the top
users with the largest volume of handled tickets. Finally, we
selected a subset of random users, comprising two client users.
For the Support role, besides the subsets of famous and most
active users, we chose a subset of five users with a similar
volume of tickets as the famous users, and a subset of random
users, thus increasing the sample diversity. We also created
several synthetic users to exercise specific policies deemed
important by the IT managers, but which were not “triggered”
by any current support user, e.g. policy P3.
TABLE III
RESULTS OBTAINED FOR THE POLICIES TARGETING THE Client ROLE
User User P1 P6 User P1 P6
type ID α=0.9 α=0.9 ID α=0.9 α=0.9
famous 101701 0.8 0.95 101703 0 0
101702 0.95 0.95 101704 0.9 0
random 101710 0.95 0 101711 0 0.8
most 101705 0.85 0.95 101708 0 0
active 101706 0.95 0.95 101709 0 0
101707 0.8 0.95
Tables III and IV present the results for these users in the
Client and Support roles, respectively. Both tables contain an
anonymised ID for each user, and the policies being considered
with their confidence level thresholds, i.e. the confidence levels
for which we deem that a user triggers a particular policy. For
each user and policy, we computed confidence intervals for
the examined behaviour characteristic at multiple confidence
levels, and the tables report the highest confidence level for
which the policy is triggered, i.e. the confidence level at which
the results obtained from the test traces is outside the interval
obtained for the reference traces. A ‘0’ indicates that the user
does not trigger the policy at any confidence level between
0.75 and 0.95. To decide the confidence level threshold of
each policy, we started to compute confidence intervals at a
confidence level α = 0.95 and analysed the obtained results,
identifying any false positive/negatives.3 Next, we lowered the
confidence level in steps of 0.05 and repeated the analysis.
The results were discussed with the IFRN IT management,
who were pleased with the effectiveness of the approach.
We start with the policies targeting the Client role, whose
results are shown in Table III. Policy P1 represents clients who
reopen tickets frequently, for which we defined as “famous”
the users with a reopen rate above 50% of their opened
tickets.4 Considering these famous users, the results for users
101702 and 101704 were as expected, with both users trigger-
ing the policy (at 0.95 and 0.9 confidence levels, respectively).
User 101703 was expected to not trigger the policy. Although
user 101701 did not trigger the policy, it was expected to do so
according to the initial manual analysis. Upon further analysis
of this user, we confirmed that the result is correct, and the
user indeed should not trigger policy P1; this discrepancy was
due to an error in the (tedious) manual analysis. From the most
active users, only user 101706 triggered policy P1. This was
an unexpected result, that was confirmed by a close inspection
of the user’s activity traces. The same situation happened with
user 101710 from the random subset. Policy P6 was designed
to detect clients expensive to the Ticket Support System. The
results from Table III are as expected for the famous users.
For the most active users, the results were unexpected but
confirmed upon a closer look at the “offending” users (i.e.
101705, 101706, 101707).
The results for the policies targeting the Support role are
3This involved an independent manual analysis of the activity of these users
by the IT managers.
4Note that the rate of reopened tickets differs from the expected number of
reopens per ticket, which is the metric used by policy P1, so not all “famous”
users were expected to trigger the policy.
TABLE IV
RESULTS OBTAINED FOR THE POLICIES TARGETTING THE Support ROLE
User User P2 P3 P4 P5
type ID α=0.8 α=0.95 α=0.85 α=0.95 α=0.99
201701 0 0 0 0.95 0.95
201702 0.75 0 0.8 0.99 0.99
famous 201703 0.85 0 0 0.99 0.99
201704 0.75 0 0.8 0.99 0.99
201705 0.75 0 0 0.99 0.99
201706 0 0 0.85 0.99 0.99
201707 0 0 0.85 0 0
most 201708 0.8 0 0 0.99 0.99
active 201705 0.75 0 0 0.99 0.99
201703 0.85 0 0 0.99 0.99
201711 0 0 0 0.99 0.99
201712 0 0 0 0 0
201713 0 0 0 0.99 0.99
similar 201714 0 0 0 0 0
201715 0 0 0 0.85 0
201716 0 0 0 0.99 0.99
x1 0 0.95 0 0 0
synthetic x2 0 0.95 0 0 0
x3 0 0.9 0 0 0
x4 0 0.85 0 0 0
random 201721 0 0 0 0.99 0.99
201722 0 0 0 0 0
presented in Table IV. Policy P2 handles support attendants
with high rates of suspended tickets. Based on the number of
tickets handled by a Support user, we defined as elevated a
rate of suspension above 50% of the tickets handled. After an
analysis of the results obtained, we selected a confidence level
threshold of 0.8, which correctly identified users 201703 and
201708 as “offending” users.
Policy P3 deals with Support users that cancel tickets
without requiring more information. This is a very unusual
behaviour for the Ticket Support System, and guarding against
it was explicitly requested by the management team. This
policy was not triggered by any of our users, and thus we
created several synthetic users to analyse it. Four users were
synthesized: two offenders, and two regular users with similar
levels of activity. Since the results for this policy were obtained
with synthetic users, it needs a careful revision, and possibly
be run against the complete user base of SUAP.
Policy P4 deals with support users that open tickets on
behalf of clients where the ticket is subsequently abandoned,
another very suspicious behaviour for the Ticket Support
System of SUAP. In our experiments, a confidence level of
0.85 proved adequate, being able to detect some unexpected
cases with users 201706 and 201707. Upon further analysis of
these particular users, we have confirmed that the results are
indeed valid.
Finally, policy P5 addresses support users that are “lazy”,
which according to the management team is a support user
with a high combined rate of suspended, canceled, reopened
and reallocation tickets (cf. the “lazy” cost/reward structure
from our DTMC model from Section IV-B). An analysis of
the results obtained showed that a confidence level of 0.99
produced consistent results with all selected users, including
those that were not expected to trigger such policy (as users
TABLE V
POLICIES FOR THE SUPPORT ROLE
User User P2 P3 P4 P5
type ID α=0.8 α=0.95 α=0.85 α=0.95 α=0.99
201701 – – – – –
201702 #2 – – #2 #2
famous 201703 – – #1, #2 #1, #2 #1,#2
201704 – – – – –
201705 – – – – –
201706 #2 – – #1, #2 #1, #2
most 201707 – – – – –
active 201708 #2 – #1, #2 #1, #2 #1,#2
201711 – – – – –
201712 – – – – –
similar 201713 #2 – – #1, #2 #1,#2
201714 – – – – –
201715 #1 – – #1 –
random 201721 – – – #1, #2 #1,#2
201722 #1 – – #1 –
Key: #1=policy triggered on day 45; #2=policy triggered on day 60
201708 and 201721 for example).
We wanted saRBAC to be precise, robust to small variations
in user behavioural patterns, and resistant to false alarms.
The experiments presented so far assessed calibrated the
confidence level threshold for each policy from Table II.
Expectedly, reducing a threshold may increase the number of
false positives, while lowering it may increase the number
of false negatives. As an example, policy P1 presents false
negatives when used with a confidence level of 0.95 (e.g. user
101704 from Table III). Accordingly, we chose a confidence
level of 0.9 for the policy so as to achieve a correct result for
all examined users. In contrast, for policy P2 we noted that
a confidence level of 0.75 produced three false positives (cf.
Table IV), but a confidence level of 0.8 was adequate.
B. Closed-loop Control Experiments
To investigate the effectiveness of saRBAC when running
as a control loop, we carried out additional experiments
using two datasets not utilised for calibration. These datasets
comprised the log entries from days 31–45 and from days
31–60 of the 60-day period during which we monitored the
system, respectively (recall that the calibration used the log
entries from days 1–30). The new experiments focused on
the Support role and assessed the robustness of the saRBAC
calibration.
For each policy, Table V shows the users that triggered
the policy for the analysis carried out using each dataset,
i.e. on day 45 and on day 60. The results for policies P2
and P4 were consistent between the experiments for the two
datasets, having correctly identified the expected “offending”
users, and additionally several unexpected but still valid cases
of offending support users such as 201706, 201713, 201715.
For policy P5 with confidence level 0.99, the offending users
201715 and 201722 did not trigger the policy (false negatives).
However, the two cases are correctly handled by the policy
at 0.95 confidence level, so we confirmed α = 0.95 as the
appropriate confidence level for this policy. For the reasons
discussed in the previous section, we kept policy P3 although
TABLE VI
RESULTS OBTAINED FOR THE PERFORMANCE EXPERIMENTS (REPORTED
IN SECONDS, AS MEAN TIME ± STANDARD DEVIATION)
Policy Log analyser Model updater FACT Total
P1 0.00069 32.71 30.65 63.37±0.00017 ±0.53 ±0.20 ±0.68
P2 0.00059 32.46 30.80 63.27±0.000010 ±0.31 ±0.21 ±0.36
P3 0.00048 32.45 30.61 63.06±0.0000087 ±0.35 ±0.1127 ±0.3433
P4 0.00056 32.74 30.69 63.43±0.00004 ±0.50 ±0.31 ±0.81
P5 0.00060 32.52 30.71 63.24±0.000024 ±0.2201 ±0.04907 ±0.2875
P6 0.0005 31.86 30.76 62.63±0.000007 ±0.84 ±0.20 ±0.73
it again was not triggered by any user.
C. Performance Experiment
We also conducted experiments to assess the overheads of
our approach. The experiments examined the performance of
the saRBAC prototype when running on a single processing
node, by measuring the execution times of its three main
components, i.e. Log analyser, Model updater and FACT
model checker. All experiments used real log data from SUAP
over a 30-day time window (the same window considered
for the calibration experiments) and involved a total of 919
tickets and 63 users (23 support users and 40 client users).
All experiments were executed on 2.2 GHz Core i7 computer
with 8GB of RAM and were repeated three times.
Table VI presents the mean and standard deviation of the
component execution times in seconds. The analysis of each
policy takes approximately one second per user (above 60
seconds for the 63 users). While this overhead may seem
too high for large business processes, it must be noted
that saRBAC is meant to run infrequently (e.g. every few
days) because the detection of insider threats within business
processes with infrequent user activities requires multiple
days of logs. Moreover, the performance of saRBAC can be
improved dramatically by carrying out the essentially inde-
pendent analyses required for different policies and different
users concurrently, potentially after refactoring the architecture
of our saRBAC prototype in line with existing self-adaptive
system architectures [20], [21], [22], [23].
VII. RELATED WORK
There are several works on increasing the flexibility of ac-
cess control mechanisms. These have been focused on adding
dynamism to access control decisions, usually by means of
incorporating risk and benefit values in the access control
decision making process [24]. For example, Shaikh et al. [25]
presented a method for risk-based access control decision,
in which risk and trust are calculated based on historic user
behaviour of granted access. Cheng et al. [26] employed Fuzzy
Logic, which is quantified and used to define several thresholds
according to risk tolerance. Based on trade-off analysis of risk
versus benefit the solution grants access but with additional
actions to mitigate risk depending on the threshold. Examples
of such additional actions include: stronger logging, extra
charge for the user, different access levels token. Kandala
et al. [27] present an abstract formal model for expressing
risk-based access control policies. The model is then applied
to UCON access control model [28], which is extended to
accommodate risk-awareness.
However, there is a distinction between dynamic access
control decisions and dynamic modification of access control
policies. The approaches based on the first consider that risk
related information is encoded in the access control policy
beforehand, restricting the decision making process to whether
or not to grant access to a particular request. On the other hand,
it is possible to notice a number of works moving towards the
dynamic modification of the access control policies in response
to detected situations.
Bijon et al. [29] present a formalisation of an adaptive quan-
tified risk-aware RBAC system, identifying how to utilize esti-
mated risk values and thresholds in the access control decision
making. Additionally, their approach also considers that risk
values/threshold can be dynamically modified, identifying the
need for monitoring, anomaly detection and risk re-estimation
functions together with mechanisms to automatically revoke
roles and permissions from users and roles respectively. An-
other approach is the Self-Adaptive Authorization Framework
(SAAF) [7], which focus on adapting authorization policies
during run-time. SAAF has been demonstrated in the context
of PERMIS authorisation system [30], in which access control
policies are dynamically modified for dealing with insider
threats, such as, an elevated number of downloads in a short
time window. Ariadne [31], [32], [33] is an approach for
dealing with security threats in Cyber-Physical systems by
modelling the topology of the system (its physical objects and
agents) together with its security requirements. This model
is then used for conducting threat analysis and response
planning at run-time about possible future changes in the
topology, such as access of an agent to a particular area, for
detecting violations of security requirements. Based on this,
the approach suggests changes in the access controls rules for
mitigating the identified threats.
Similar to those approaches, our work looks for means
of adapting access control policies. However, different from
them, we have focused on how to identify anomalous be-
haviour as trigger for adaptation. In this context, Legg et
al. [1], [34], [35] presented an insider threat detection and
analysis system. Their solution builds tree profiles of users
based on different types of logging information and applies
a semi-supervised approach to assess how the current obser-
vations deviate from previously observed activities. In case of
abnormality detection, the system raises an alarm. Probabilistic
techniques have also been used for responding to network
attacks, particularly as part of Intrusion Response Systems.
[36] employs a Markov Decision Process as planning for
deciding how to respond to a detected intrusion. Unlike this
approach, our work focuses on insider threats operating inside
trusted network boundaries, which the work in [30] does not
consider.
Different from these approaches, we are looking at the appli-
cation level, applying our approach to socio-technical systems
based on business processes, where there is a strong human
interaction. We also employ confidence level calculations for
improving our decision making process. As we have more
observations of normal behaviour, the confidence in our model
(”profile”) of normal behaviour and in making decisions based
on it increases, allowing us to take different actions. Thus,
adaptation is needed/useful. One clear observation from these
related work is that access to real-world data is difficult, and
thus, researchers synthesize data that are similar to that of a
real-world enterprise, or use a subset of data points, or apply
insider threat detection techniques to other problem domains.
In our work, we gather a variety and volume of data observed
in a modern real-world organization.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced saRBAC, an approach to dynamically adapt-
ing the role-based access control system of a business process
in order to mitigate insider threats. Our saRBAC approach uses
a Markov model and execution traces of the business process
to establish confidence intervals for key characteristics of user
behaviour, and thus to identify users with harmful behaviour
and to demote them to more restrictive roles. We implemented
and evaluated saRBAC for a real IT support business process
used by a large academic organisation. Because of the business
criticality of this process, the preliminary evaluation results
were obtained by running our implementation in an advisory
operating mode, i.e. by providing suggestions of RBAC re-
configurations that IT managers from the organisation could
examine.
As illustrated in Section VI, the preliminary evaluation
results were positive, and as a next step of the project, we plan
to start using the system in fully self-adaptive operating mode
for the policies with no or very low numbers of false positives,
and with low numbers of false negatives. Additionally, we
will examine further and fine-tune the policies that do not
belong to this category, with a view to identify best practices
for specifying saRBAC policies. In future work, we intend to
apply saRBAC to other business processes (initially within
the same organization) in order to assess and improve the
flexibility of its policy specification formalism as well as its
effectiveness at supporting a wider range of insider threat
scenarios. Another area of future work is the development of a
high-level language for the specification of saRBAC policies,
to support users unfamiliar with the first-order logic formalism
used by the current version of our approach.
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